Human Dignity in World Religions: Toward a Global Bioethics and Biolaw

About the Book This scholarly work is a remarkable contribution to the basic bioethical discussion. The rich perspectives of the world religions provide proof that the idea of human dignity has a high potential for consensus in the dialogue of the world religions on the ethical problems of modern life sciences. This stimulating material offers an important orientation for understanding of religious conceptions of human being and their significance for global bioethics. This research additionally analyses the legal use of the concept of human dignity in universal and regional declarations, national constitutions and legal systems. This book will surely readers, who want to learn the contribution of world religions to bioethics through their conceptions of human being and human dignity.

About the Author Rev. Dr. J. Charles Davis is an Associate Professor of the Albert Ludwigs University of Freiburg; an Academician of the Pontifical Academy for Life at the Vatican City; a Research Fellow of the Humboldt Research Foundation, Bonn; and a member of Forum for Medical Ethics Society, Mumbai.

He has a Diploma in Teacher Education (D.T.E.); three Bachelors in Philosophy (B.Ph.), Sociology (B.A.) Theology (B.Th.); and a Masters in Philosophy and Religion (M.A.) from India. He did an Intensive Bioethics Course (IBC) at the Kennedy Institute of Ethics, Washington DC. He received his Doctorate in Moral Theology and Bioethics (Dr. theol.) with summa cum laude from the Jesuit University of Sankt Georgen Frankfurt, Germany. After years of teaching and research, he obtained his Habilitation (Dr. habil.) with awards of Venia Legendi and Professorship for Moral Theology and Bioethics for his magnum opus on "Human Dignity in World Religions: Toward a Global Bioethics and Biolaw" from the University of Freiburg, Germany. He has published many research articles. He is a recipient of many scholarships and awards.

Foreword The concept of human dignity plays a central role in the bioethical debates of liberal societies on the moral and legal assessment of abortion, stem cell research, pre-implantation diagnostics, therapeutic or reproductive cloning. assisted suicide and mercy killing on request. Nevertheless, there is no clarity among the different moral theories on the content, the rationale and the scope of the principle of human dignity. Therefore, for many, a consensus on controversial bioethical issues on the basis of the principle of human dignity seems futile. They see in it nothing but an empty formula that cannot claim any argumentative value due to its susceptibility to ideological and religious connotations in bioethical discourses. For others, the recourse to human dignity serves as a rhetorical abbreviation that stands for the claim to universal validity of a deontological ethics based on the Kantian principle of autonomy. Interdictions of objectification and of (total) instrumentalization of humans are the relevant principles for a concrete formation of judgment in bioethical conflicts, which have their moral philosophical basis in the established "end- in-itself" formula of the categorical imperative.

From a philosophical point of view, three layers of meaning of the concept of human dignity can be distinguished; an intrinsic dignity, an attributed dignity and another form, which could be called inflorescent dignity. The concept of human dignity can fulfil its intended function in ethical debates; only, if the gap between these three layers of meaning is strictly observed: Since the intrinsic basic stratum of human dignity precedes the other two levels of meaning, no one has to pay for his or her own dignity through his or her own behaviour that needs justification. S/he owes this neither to social recognition by others nor to their unfolding through one's own moral action. On the contrary, the social recognition of an individual demanded by others signifies the only appropriate response to an already given rightful claim through the humanity of each human individual. If human dignity were to be constituted only through the process of social interaction, it could also be revoked from individuals by others according to the prevailing moral, social and legal standards in a society. As much as people depend on social recognition for actuation and realization of their dignity, as little do they owe their dignity to these reciprocal social Even if the understanding of human dignity broke loose from its religious relationships of recognition. roots later in a secular context, the sacred texts of the great world religions remain an important root of its origin. This study examines the contribution of the individual world religions to the formation of the idea of human dignity in a comparative perspective. First, the ideas of creation and redemption of three monotheistic variants of religion, i.e., Judaism, Christianity (in her Catholic and Protestant forms) and Islam are presented. This is followed by the Eastern religious systems of Hinduism, Jainism and Buddhism classic form and in the form of Mahayana Buddhism. Finally, the rich in detail study is devoted to the ideas of Confucianism and the Bahai religion regarding human dignity. After this passage through the complex paths of the history of religion, in which the author serves to be a reliable travel companion to the reader, the legal texts of the international community of peoples and states are examined, in which the commitment to human dignity has been incorporated. Since the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, the commitment to the invulnerability of human dignity has played an important role in many national constitutions as the basis of individual human rights. However, from a legal perspective, there are two different opposing conceptions of human dignity, which can be rather described as more liberal- freedom-oriented or more conservative-protection-oriented views. In the first case, the reference to human dignity serves as a justification for the demand for greater individual freedom of choice. In the second case, it imposes restrictions on freedom where the dignity of the third parties is affected. In most cases, the tension between the concepts of "dignity as empowerment" and "dignity as protection" is not resolved at the theoretical level, but only in the practical application to concrete situations.

Book's Contents and Sample Pages