Indian Realism

About the Book:

This Book is an attempt at a reconstruction of the Yogacara subjective idealism and an exhaustive criticism of it by different schools of Indian realism. The exposition of the doctrine is based on the works of Santaraksita and Kamalasila and the critics of Vijnanavada. Generally the exposition and criticism of the doctrine by every eminent thinker have been given separately. Most of the critics give a fair and impartial account of Vijnanavada and contribute to the clarification of the idealist position. The author has dealt with the controversy between subjective idealism and realism in Indian thought and tried to give a fairly full account of the arguments by which Indian realists seek to establish the reality of the external world.

Incidentally the Yogacara subjective idealism has been compared with the idealism of Berkeley and the sensationalism of Hume and the resemblances and differences between them have been briefly noted. A striking feature of the book is that the parallel arguments of many contemporary realists have been quoted simply to indicate that the philosophical genius of a particular type is apt to move in the same groove, irrespective of the soil it thrives in.

About the Author:

JADUNATH SINHA (1892-1978) was a mystic philosopher and one of the most eminent and profound thinkers of today. He wrote practically on all aspects and schools of Indian Philosophy in his voluminous works. He was a brilliant researcher and also did pioneer work in Indian psychology in 3 Vols. He taught in several colleges in Bengal for short periods before joining Meerut College as Professor of Philosophy, where he remained for a number of years and at last resigned in order to devote whole of his time to writing and research.

Preface

This book is an attempt at a reconstruction of the Yogacara Vijnanavada (Subjective Idealism), and an exhaustive criticism of it by different schools of Indian realism. The exposition of the doctrine is based on the works of Santaraksita and Kamalasila and the critics of Vijnanavada. Generally I have given the exposition and criticism of the doctrine by every eminent thinker separately. Most of the critics give a fair and impartial account of Vijnanavada, and con- tribute to the clarification of the idealistic position. I may mention the names of profound thinkers like Kumarila, Sankara, Jayanta Bhatta, Vacaspatimisra, and Sridhara among others. I have dealt with the criticism of Vijnanavada by the Buddhist realists, the Jaina, the Sankhya-Yoga, the Mimamsakas, the Nyaya—Vaisesika, and the different schools of the Vedanta. I have not traced the historical evolution of Indian subjectivism which is beyond the scope of this book. I have simply dealt with the controversy between subjective idealism and realism in Indian thought, and tried to give a fairly full account of the arguments by which Indian realists seek to establish the reality of the external world. I have not touched the metaphysical question as to the nature of the external world.

I have incidentally compared the Yogacara subjectivism with the idealism of Berkeley and the sensationism of Hume, and briefly noted resemblances and differences between them. I venture to say, Berkeleyan idealism cannot claim the thoroughness and metaphysical acumen of the Buddhist idealism, which preceded it by at least one thousand years. I have not compared any type of Indian realism with an analogous type of `Western realism. But I have quoted parallel arguments of many contemporary realists simply to indicate that the philosophical genius of a particular type is apt to move in the same groove, irrespective of the soil it thrives in. I have profusely quoted texts to corroborate my statements. The table of contents and the index may help the reader in following the arguments.

Realism is the dominant note of contemporary philosophy in the west. It is extremely critical and analytical. It presses into its service the achievements of modern logic and modern science. It has had its analogue in Indian philosophy with a glorious history for centuries. So Indian Realism may be of some interest not only to the students of Indian philosophy, but also to the students of contemporary western philosophy. If it evokes some interest in Indian realism, I shall consider my labours amply repaid.

I take the opportunity of expressing my gratitude to the authorities of the Agra University who permitted me to incorporate one of the Agra University Extension Lectures in this book, which I delivered at St. John’s College, Agra, in December, 1934. I am also grateful to the authorities of the Meerut College who afforded me every facility to complete the book. I feel intense pleasure in expressing my thanks to my revered teacher, Dr. Hiralal Haldar, M.A., PH.D., the renowned author of Neo—Hegelianism, who encouraged me to publish this book.

CONTENTS

PREFACE

1. THE YOGACARA VIJNANAVADA

Madhavacaraya's account - No permanent external object is possible - A momentary object cannot be perceived - It is neither perceived as a simple atom nor as a complex body - Cognition alone is real - It is self-luminous and apprehends itself - An external object cannot be related to a cognition and be apprehended by it - The identity of an object with its cognition is proved by the law of simultaneous perception (saho-palambhaniyama) - The distinction of subject and object is an illusory appearance due to subconscious impressions of difference (bhedavasana) rooted in avidya - A similar argument in Yogavasistha - The distinction of the real and the imaginary within cognitions - Comparison of the Yogacara idealism with Berkeley's subjective idealism and Hume's sensation - Santaraksita and Kamalasila's exposition of the yogacara idealism - The Epistemological Arguments - A cognition in self-aware - Refutation of Kumarila's Theory of imperceptibility of an act of cognition- Cognition is identical with the apprehension of an object-form which is illusory - No cognition of an external object - A formless (nirakara) cognition cannot apprehend it - A cognition with a similar form (sakara) cannot apprehend it - A cognition with a different form (anyakara) cannot apprehend it - Vacaspati's summary of these arguments - The Yogacara criticism of the Sautrantiks theory of correspondence (sarupya) - The Law of Simultaneous Apprehension - No Evidence for the existence of an external object - it is neither perceptible nor inferrible - The Metaphysical Argument - The so-called external object can neither be a conglomeration of atoms nor a complex whole composed of atoms nor a gross body not made of atoms - The Yogacara position.

II. THE SAUTRANTIKA REALISM: THE REPRESENTATIVE THEORY OF PERCEPTION.

Comparison of the Sautrantika Realism with Descartes and Locke's Representationism - The Sautrantika criticism of the Yogacara Subjectivism - Criticism of the law of simultaneous apprehension (sahopalambhaniyama) - An object is not identical with cognition - The object is physical (external) while cognition is psychical (internal) - Cognition is perceived as "I" while the object is perceived as "this" or not-self as distinguished from the self - Externality of the Object cannot be treated as an illusory appearance because it presupposes the real knowledge of externality - The circular argument of the Yogacara - Common Sense bears testimony to the existence of the object - Different forms or contents of cognitions are caused by the variety of external objects - Alayavijnana and Pravrttivijnana - Criticism of the Yogacara doctrine that the variety of perceptions is due to the variety of vasanas.

III. THE YOGACARA'S CRITICISM OF THE REPRESENTATIVE THEORY OF PERCEPTION

Jayanta's account of the Yogacara's criticism of the Sautrantika Realism - Cognitions with definite forms or contents can serve all practical needs of life - The existence of external objects is a needless assumption - Two forms of a cognition and an object are not perceived - The realist admits that a cognition is apprehended before it apprehends its object and that it has a definite form - Cognitions with definite forms apprehending themselves are the only reality - Objects cannot be inferred from forms of cognitions - They are due to vasanas - Walking perceptions are without foundation in external objects like illusions, hallucinations, dreams and recollections - Parthasaratyhi's account of the Yogacara criticism of the Sautrantika Realism - Objectivity (arthatva), Causality (hetutva), Similarity (sarupya), Pragmatic use (vyavahara), and Expressibility do not constitute the cognizability of an object - No cognition of an external object is possible - Sridhara's account - The Vaibhasika criticism of the Sautrantika realism.

IV. THE JAINA REALISM

Mallisena's Exposition of the Yogacara Idealism - The Metaphysical Argument - The Epistemological Argument - Comparison with Berkeley's argument - Mallisena's Criticism of the Yogacara idealism - An act of cognition must have an object - No cognitions are objectless - External objects as distinguished from imaginary ideas have practical efficiency - Both atoms and gross bodies are real - The metaphysical argument presents no difficulty to the Jaina who advocates pluralistic realism or relativism - The denial of an external object contradicts experience - Consciousness of the self implies consciousness of the not-self - The distinction of the self (subject) and the not-self (object) is real - Criticism of sahopalambhaniyama - Cognition by its very nature apprehends itself and its object - Perception of an object in a particular place cannot be explained by vasana - Criticism of vasana - The universal experience of mankind testifies to the existence of external objects - Objects cannot be identical with cognitions because they possess opposite qualities - The Jaina realism contrasted with the Sautrantika realism - The fitness (yogyata) of a cognition for apprehending an object (Jaina).

V. THE SANKHYA-YOGA REALISM

The Sankhya criticism of Vijnanavada - The self and the not-self radically opposed to each other - The latter not reducible to the former - Criticism of vasana and the metaphysical argument (Aniruddha) - Bondage also reduced to an idea (Vijnanabhiksu) - The Yoga exposition of Vijnanavada - The Epistemological Arguments - No objects apart from cognitions but cognitions apart from objects - Identity the condition of knowability - It is proved by the law of simultaneous perception - The object, a construction of imagination - The Yoga criticism of Vijnanavada - The existence of external objects proved by perception which cannot be invalidated by imagination (Vyasa) - Valid waking perceptions different from invalid dreams caused by bodily and mental disorders (Vijnanabhiksu) - Knowability of an object by a cognition presupposes difference between them - The law of simultaneous perception cannot prove identity because it is based on the method of agreement without the help of the method of difference which is not applicable here - Vacaspati's anticipation of the "ego-centric predicament" - A cognition cannot possess externality and extension (Vacaspati) - The object remaining the same, the ideas differ; so they are different from each other (Patanjali) - The explanation of the fact - External objects and cognitions cannot come into existence together - The past and the future are real - External objects are real and permanent.

VI. THE MIMAMSAKA REALISM

Savara's criticism of Vijnanavada - Walking cognitions essentially different from dream-cognitions - A formless cognition apprehends an external object with a form - A cognition is apprehended by inference only after it has apprehended and external object - A cognition is produced by and external object - Kumarila's elaborate exposition and criticism of Vijnanavada - The existence of external objects proved by perception which cannot be invalidated by inference - Dreams, illusions, and recollections have a foundation in external objects - Difference between walking perceptions and dreams - Technical flaws in the Yogacara argument - Detailed criticism of vasana - The cognitive act is directed to an external object distinct from it - Cognition and object cannot be identical with each other - The subject object-relation between them unique in nature - A formless cognition apprehends an object with a form - The diversity of cognitions due to the diversity of objects - Variation of appearance no proof of the unreality of an object which may be multiform - Explanation of the fact - Diversity of appearances due to psychical dispositions (vasana) or to comparison with other objects - The existence of external objects proved by perception and inference, and practical considerations of morality and religion - Parthasarathimista's exposition and criticism of Vijnanavada - Elaboration of Kumarila's arguments - Prabhakara's exposition and criticism of Vijnanavada - Cognitions apprehend themselves and their objects - Prabhakara's criticism of the Sautrantika Realism.

VII. THE NYAYA-VAISESIKA REALISM

The Nyaya critique of Vijnanavada - Critical exposition of it by Gautama and Vatsyayana - The Nyaya realism and rationalism - Reality of the external world - It is amenable to analysis by reason - Illusions, desires, and dreams have a foundation in external objects - Udyotakara's criticism - Difference between cognitions and feelings - Criticism of vasana -Dreams and illusions depend on external objects - No distinction between dreaming and walking, virtue and vice, on the Yogacara theory - Criticism of perceptions of disembodied spirits - Positive arguments for the existence of external objects - Jayanta's elaborate criticism - Cognition and object essentially different - Subject-object-distinction not possible within consciousness - Objects actually perceived - Difference between cognition of an object and cognition of the cognition - Consciousness and self-consciousness - Cognitions not self-luminous - Cognitions produced by external objects - Formless cognitions apprehend external objects - Detailed Criticism of Vasana - Real basis of illusions, hallucinations, and dreams - Detailed criticism of sahopalambha, the metaphysical argument, and the variability of appearances (cf. Kumarila) - Resume of the Nyaya criticism - Sridhara's exposition and criticism of Vijnanavada - Svarupasambandha between cognition and object (Udayana) - Their relation governed by the Law of Nature (Sridhara) - The sameness of the Object of perception proves its externality - Sridhara's criticism of the Sautrantika theory of mediate knowledge of external objects.

VII. THE VEDANTA CRITIQUE OF SUBJECTIVE IDEALISM

Sankara's Absolute Idealism contrasted with the Subjective Idealism of the Yogacara - Sankara's exposition and criticism of Vijnanavada - The existence of external objects proved by perception which cannot be invalidated by abstract speculation - The law of parsimony cannot be invoked to falsify facts of experience - The law of simultaneous perception proves the difference of objects (Upeya) and cognitions (upaya) - The difference in the contents of cognitions due to the difference in their object - Cognitions cannot be related to each other as subject and object - Cognitions apprehended by the permanent Self - Difference between waking cognitions and dreams - Variety of Cognitions not due to variety of vasanas - Vacaspatimisra and Sadananda Yati's elaboration of Sankara's arguments - The empirical reality of the external world - Ramanaja's exposition and criticism of Vijnanavada - Distinction between the self and the not-self condition of consciousness - The law of simultaneous perception proves difference of cognitions and objects - Practical function of knowledge - Cognitions enable the Self to react to objects - Difference between waking cognitions and dreams both of which have a foundation in external objects - The Yogacara subjectivism invalidates his own inference - Ramanuja's criticism of the Sautrantika realism - Nimbarka, Srinivasa, Kesava Kasmirin, Madhva, Vallabha, Purusottamaji Maharaja, and Baladeva Vidhya-Bhusana's criticism of Vijnanavada.

INDEX