History Of Indian Philosophy (Set of 2 Volumes)

This two volume work is a pioneering effort by a stalwart of Indian Philosophy in German Language. Since this provides new insights, largely uncovered by other authors of Indian Philosophy, hence there was great demand and need for publishing this English translation.

In the composition of this work the three fold aim is—I. Presentation of Indian Philosophy from the beginnings to the present times in which every phenomenon of importance finds its corresponding place. II. To present the reader a real history of Indian Philosophy, not a crude assemblage of half-worked materials but as far as it is possible a description of the origin of single doctrines and systems and of their development which should be beyond the accidentally of traditions. III. Finally, an attempt is made to give the work a readable form. It should not bring in scientific discussions but a presentation of the results of scientific research.

The first part, the first volume of which appears herewith, is devoted to the oldest period of Indian Philosophy from the beginnings until towards the end of the first millennium after Christ. The first volume embraces the earliest period and the Samkhya and the Yoga systems arid therefore, already thus goes beyond the detailed volume of Deussen’s presentation. The following volumes set forth the presentation of the nature- philosophical systems, above all the Vaigesika, the Buddhistic systems and the period of the second blossoming, which in the sphere of Epistemology and Logic, performed the most important achievements. The second Part will embrace the philosophy of the later times and will carry the presentation up to the present times.

Erich Frauwallner was born in 1898 in Vienna and was admitted in 1928 as University lecturer for Indian Philology and Ancient Cultural Sciences. From 1939 to 1945, he was Professor of Indology and Iranistik, Since 1945, when the Faculty in the University was closed, he lived as private Professor in Vienna.

There is a knowledge which does not aim at a particular object or a limited sphere of objects but which concentrates itself on the Unity of the Objects, on their connection. The thought directed on this unity must at last step beyond the objects and their empirical isolated relations and must transcend them in order to gain the horizon through which the Whole comes into view. This coming into view of the Whole is, however, the essence of the theory. The history of human thought, in philosophy as well as in science, shows that the thought has this relation to the Whole, that it is continually sustained in the direction of the unity and the total comprehension of the Knowable Whole. Whether the Whole of Reality can be comprehensible objectively in a definite collection of Knowledge is a different question perhaps this remains no question for him who thinks that the Whole (inclusive) of the objects can again never be itself an object among others.

But when the whole as an object is never attainable on the objective level but is a truth which the thought will never be able to grasp, then another way must be trodden. The objects are not the objects of this goal which leads to something beyond them in the transcending movement of thought that leads to the Whole of existence beyond the objects. This way has also the starting point, the end-point or the goal, with the direction. The end-point or the goal is the whole; the starting-point, starting from which the direction sets itself towards the whole, is the point from which the thought must start, in order to be able to reach generally the Whole ; it is the ground and for the widest, most comprehensive Whole, it is the last ground or the ‘Ur-ground.’

Only from the highest peak of a mountain, there opens the view on the whole of the landscape. The ground or foundation of a building must be all the more deeply laid, if the building is bigger. The building which should embrace the Whole world must have the deepest foundation. Out of the root which seizes the deepest in the earth, the tree raises itself to the developed form and fullness. As these images of the mountain, the building and the tree make a graphic impression, so do the ground (basis) and the whole stand related and ordered with one another. There is no whole without the ground and without the whole the ground is no ground. The structure of thought, which can unlock the reality, forms the arrangement or ordering of the ground and the whole. in respect of this problem of the ground, Logic must be taken note of: The thought strives not only to know a definite object i.e. to define what it is (idea, definition) and to ascertain that in fact it is (judgment) but to prove, why it is. The integrity of the stated logical structure of thought which defines from the point of ideas, which judges and proves, is, however, disturbed if these forms of symbolization of thinking and representative presentation are mixed with one another. The thought which defines an object, the defining, limiting thought cannot be, in one stroke, equated with the thought that proves out of this is produced a logical deformation with all its consequences. Thus the structurally logical distinction between the thought of the ground and of the objects is an important start for the understanding of the theoretical thought form which mediates between the ground and the object.

The series of grounds must be carried up to the last in order to be able to fulfil their function of proof. It is not accidental that everywhere, where the whole of existence or the world comes into the view-point of an all-embracing thought, a question is at the same time raised regarding the ultimate ground or cause, or regarding the ground of the world. The world as an all-embracing unity is, in general, to be perceived only from the ultimate ground. Tins ultimate ground being the last and the ultimate one is no more to be proved, it is unconditioned, why, in its basis it is the unconditioned itself the Absolute. Thus are seen the Ground and the Whole—the absolute Ground and the all-embracing Whole which we call as the world, attuned with one another, ordered in relation to one another into a connection in which the thought attains its full, integral form- dimension. From the Absolute as (ultimate) ground, the whole of the existing as the world is and must be always taken into consideration. Because one must be clear about the fact that this most basic thought in the ultimate sense gives the historical and principal basis for all the systematic fundamental thoroughness of thought to which claim is laid in philosophy as well as in science.

It is an occurrence from the point of world-history that this thought has first made its structure evident in the books of the wisdom of ancient India, that there it first unfolded itself, and underwent its first historical formulation. Therein lies the importance of ancient Indian thought, “these earliest impulses of philosophical thought, of which we know” (G. Misch), as the historical beginning of philosophy.

It cannot be disputed that the innermost unity and the ultimate ground (cause) of the world forms the theme of the oldest Indian speculation. It is a fact that this speculation has originated with religion in the closest connection with it and has unfolded itself out of its connection with the Absolute. One could assert about every philosophy that it is obliged to religion for its origin in the epochal sense. Still this relation shows a characteristic difference. The Greek Philosophy is related to religion dialectically and develops itself out of contrast to it, in the form of that other religion of thought, purified through reason, formed in the form of the concept which has brought forth the philosophical God- idea, independent of religion in the idea of the good (Plato) and of the unmoved mover (Aristotle). Such is not the case with Indian thought. The Indian speculation has never departed from the soil or field of religion ; it rather nourishes itself continually and directly out of the forces of this soil (of religion) from which it never uprooted itself. The speculation has, however, from its side reformed and developed the structure of religion from the inside. And thus the process was introduced which led from polytheism, the doctrine of many godheads and henotheism, through the favouring of one god, to Pantheism so characteristic of Indians, the unity of God aid the world. This process was started— and therein consists its agreement with the Greek Philosophy through the metaphysical, theoretical thought-form, through that thinking which, detaching itself from the empirical manifoldness. strives in such absoluteness after radical unification, after the unity from the root itself, after the unity arising out 0f the ultimate root, after an absolute unity of manifold things out of an ultimate ground or Ur-ground. When this thought starts, all multifariousness, all the manifoldness of the external world goes into the mill of the last doubting and deactivation. This empirical world is, in its compact immanence as the world, shaken up through the questionability of its variegated manifoldness, of the abundance of its form and look which overpower the naive mind of the sensuous or the materialistic. Now the mind wishes to withdraw itself from the power of the abundance and gain for itself a form of the world, not out of the sensuous, but out of the mind. The reflecting mind succeeds in overcoming the sensuous manifold through a significant unity and in allowing to understand out of it a meaningful and therefore an understandable whole, as the world only in general.

This process of crisis seizes the world of the senses, of the sensuous experience in its whole extension, and therefore also the graphic forms of the gods of the polytheistic religion. When God India, in a song3, as one intoxicated with the Soma-drink is derided as a reeling drunkard, the godliness itself totters in its appearance and vanishes with it. This deep-reaching crisis of religious consciousness from which the most shining figure of the divine world, like India himself,—the remaining are seen ridiculed in a song us frogs4—does not remain spared, can only be explained through the breaking-in of a new, world-building thought which is able to—and wishes to—abstract itself from the several individual gods5. This thought breaks its old path through the twilight of the gods which was generated by it, and brings forth the sun of a new god which, with its light, still illuminates the sunken forms of the past. That it is, as a matter of fact, the philosophical, metaphysical thought of unity which here breaks forth, may be proved in isolated particular cases.

The four collections of the Veda (Rg-, Sama-, Yajur, and Atharva-veda-) contain as their inner kernel the songs and the prayers of sacrificial liturgy in religious poetry. Around this kernel, there are joined, following one another, like shells, the Brähmana works for the interpretation of the ritual and sacrificial ceremonies, the Aranyakas or forest books, embodying the thoughts, arising among the thinkers in the loneliness of the forest, and the Upaniads, containing the reflections arising out of meditative absorption in the Brahma, the holiest of all. Thus one can read into them a sequence of steps which leads, from the religious experiences and revelations of the poet and the seer of the past ages on the way of reflection and meditation, to making accessible the kernel of the Brahma itself, as in the Upaniads, through a meditative thought-process which stands out as essentially different from the Western Logic of ideas and dialectic. This process of the conviction of the transcending experiences in the thought-form of its available presentation is, at bottom, the process of the theory in which the Indian thought, in spite of the above-mentioned distinctive thought-structures, is connected with the Western thought. It is, therefore, well justified to lay, at the basis, the movement of thought, meditative-thoughtful formulation of the contents of the experience or knowledge, as the basic process for all the formulations of ideas in Indian speculation.

It is indispensable, for right understanding, to comprehend the start of this metaphysical-theoretical thought-movement rightly. While doing so, one should take into consideration that the meditative thought of the original texts arises out of religious poetry, from the songs and the prayers which belong to the constituents of sacrificial liturgy. This liturgy is holy service and consists as such, in the realization of a transcendent, holy order in the world, that order (i-tam) according to which the sacrifice is to be performed. The songs and the prayers accompany the sacrificial performance and embody in their wording its full significance. The words of the ritual text have the magical power to procure and bring forth the holy and the whole order of the world out of the holy, divine, Absolute itself wherein the wholeness of the world as the safe, intact whole of existence is secured out of the ultimate, transcendent ground, out of the Ur-ground. This essential identity of the ritual order with the absolute world-order, the essential character of its consummation for the maintenance and security of the order of the world, is the deepest significance of the ritual-cultic function. To produce again and again the holiness and the wholeness of the whole world and to maintain it securely, is the maintenance of the truth of the cultic performance; it has the world before its eyes, a continual perfection of the intact wholeness which arises out of the connection with the Absolute, this maintenance, this cultivation of the cult, a continual construction and building of the world being carried out on the ultimate, absolute ground, wherein culture according to the name and the fact stands ultimate and the deepest.

So it can be no wonder that the meditative reflection would be able to awaken the meaning and picture of the world out of this cultic ground. The holy cult-event revolving round the one centre, around the Absolute, allows the universe to arise spiritually before the contemplative vision. This universe is the original occurrence of world-formation and the foundation of the world as the all related to the unity, out of the ultimate ground. This is the original idea of the Universe arising out of the religious-cultic thought. The meditative reflection of artificial world-formation leads over or beyond the contents of the revelation of religious poetry, in an elucidating, clear and perspicuous way, to the structure of unity, to the close compactness, and the connection of the one ‘which the world in its innermost core holds together’ and gives rise to the reflecting thought with its own independent sharpness. It is a necessary consequence that, with the reflecting-meditative thought joined with the contents of knowledge or experiences of religious consciousness, there sets in a movement of thought which strives after the absolute point of unity of the world and allows all existing things to he included in the Absolute Unity as existing alone. This movement emerges forth in the hymn of unity of l)irghatamas6 in which, together with the removal of the gods, the one God, standing supreme over the gods or better still, the one Godhead, springs forth, first as the one, Prajapati, still thought of as a person, in order to present, however, later on, the (only) one, through more intensive formulation of meditative-abstractive thought in this beginning philosophical speculation. On account of this, this whole train of thought proves to be an original philosophical one and no more as a religious one, for which the concrete personalization of the ultimate ground of the world is always the song of unity (Rgveda 1. l64) culminates in the utterance : ekam sad vipra bahudha vandanti ‘the poets call, what is only one, many’.’ With this, it is clear that many gods are traced back by the religious poetry to one Godhead. The one (ekam) is not meant adjectively as a quality but as a substantive, as the upholding centre of reality. That is why it is said:tad ekam, the or that One. This One is at the same time everything, as it is emphasized in the Valakhilya hymn ekam vaidam bahudha sarvam This is one and has become all’. That is only possible through the fact that one has become wholly like a lump of salt9 which dissolves itself completely in the water of the sea and still remains contained therein. Therein becomes evident the limitless process of arising and passing away, ‘the rolling wheel’ (Nietzsche) of innumerable ups and downs, the godly process of natura naturans which brings forth everything and at the same time remains withdrawing into itself everything. The nature of the becoming (origin) lies in the beginning in which everything in the course (of development) is decided up- to the end which is already set forth jointly in the beginning. It is a difficult problem to unite or reconcile this end, which already lies in the world and in the immanence, with the beginning which must lie in the transcendent, in order to secure the permanent cycle of being. The decisive beginning which contains everything in itself and allows everything to depart out of itself, is the Origin. So the Origin must necessarily be the one which holds everything in itself in a simple form and this One as the creative reality must necessarily be the Origin leading to the unfoldment of the whole. The hymn of creation’° thus emphasizes that which lies at the basis of all objects and their distinctions, the absolute occurrence of the origin as the creative impulse of the unity: “Not the non-being (asad) ,nor also the being (sad), neither the death was at that time nor the life, neither the night nor the dazzling light of the day.” Thus the contrasts consisting of the dialectical texture of reality, until the last Ur-contrast of existence and non-existence, are overhauled in favour of the strong unity, the monology of the beginning.

This work, the first volume of which appears herewith, will bring into its compass a connected presentation of the Indian Philosophy from the beginnings to the present times. Originally, I had planned a comprehensive scientific work which would not only show the basic lines of development but also draw on all the results of research and sketch the problems candidly and would contain the rich sources and literary statements or passages. But this is not the time for a gigantic work of this kind, Besides, it demands at least a minimum of external favourable conditions which, at this period of my life, are denied to me. And above all such a work cannot be written here in vienna where indology has since a few decade been neglected Beside the chief work, I had also thought of a second work which should bring the presentation of Indian philosophy to wider circles, i.e., not only for the of gist’s but also for the philosophers and in general for everybody who has an interest in the subject. It is this work, the first part or volume of which I place here before the readers.

In the composition of this work, I have a threefold aim before my eyes. First of all, it should contain a presentation of total Indian philosophy from the beginnings to the present times in which every phenomenon of importance finds its Core-responding place. Further I wish to bring to the reader a real history of Indian philosophy, not a crude assemblage of half- worked materials but as far as it is possible, a description of’ the origin of single doctrines and systems and of their development which should be beyond the accidentally of traditions. Finally it will be my attempt, so far as the coy material allows it, to give the work a readable form. It should not bring in scientific discussions but a presentation of the results of scientific research.

To reach this aim, a completely new working up of the stuff proved to be necessary. Some things which had been dealt with up to this time, in a disproportionate extent as in Vedic philosophy, had to be shortened. Incomparably some thing more must further be shaped out, and still more completely written anew. Some things much more important, which are lost, must be won back and supplemented and the unimportant which has remained casually preserved must be repressed to the proper proportions. And it was necessary to unburden the treatise as far as possible of scientific accessories. I have, therefore, basically renounced every polemic. A choice list of the most important literature and the necessary references are given in the notes.

In the face of plenty of stuff, it was further necessary to observe a number of restrictions. First of all I have dealt, in short, proportionately with beginnings. Though it is important to explore the source of all phenomena, the inquiry into the past beginnings loses itself all too easily in the dusky distance. The first task is to ascertain once clearly, what has originated, Then one can ask how it is originated.

Further I have left out of account entering into the question of foreign influence, interesting though it may be. It is necessary first of all to comprehend unambiguously and clearly the Indian facts and to present them in that form. Then can the question of dependence on foreign phenomena be raised. I have also desisted from citing the agreements with foreign philosophies, Above all, I have omitted the philosophic assessment and other appraisal of the material. I wish to describe exclusively the Indian philosophy in its originality, as it can be considered historically. Even further utilisation of the material is a problem by itself; besides, others may better solve it. The strength of one, who has opened the way for the first time to long distances in the primeval forest of Indian philosophy, is already heavily taxed in the undertaking.

On some points, I have indeed resolved, partly freely and partly under compulsion, to bargain for a loading of my presentation. First of all I have, during the presentation of particular doctrines and systems, advanced a short review of their external history and literature. I have done it because, many readers perhaps attach weight to it and in this sphere there is no pertinent handbook easily available. Further I have occasionally allowed the sources to speak, even at the risk of being lengthy. But I believe, such lengthiness is less tiresome than the dry presentation of pure doctrinal thoughts contents. And the idea of the described subject gains essentially in graphic lucidity. Partly I have become more lengthy than I liked to be. But I would request the reader to consider the following.

He who gives shape to an already known stuff anew, can form it as he likes, emphasise the interesting, shortly touch upon the dry or leave it. But quite different is the case with one who presents a subject in the largest part for the first time. He can presuppose nothing as known, cannot refer to other presentation s hut must bring symmetry to the total stuff. And so a certain, perhaps somewhat tiresome lengthiness cannot be occasionally avoided.

In one point I have indeed deliberately and consciously undertaken the debit-side or handicap of my treatise.

I have consciously and purposely abstained from recasting— as it is often seen—Indian philosophy to correspond with European taste. It was obviously necessary to arrange the thought-contents of the doctrines systematically. But I have carried in them neither European formulations of questions nor European formations of thought. I have avoided what interests or grips the European and to keep back or pass over the remaining which may not interest him. I have, on the other hand, endeavoured to present to the reader Indian philosophers as they are and to show what stirred them, how they put questions in their own way and sought the kinds of answers in their own way. The work on that account may be less stimulating and more irksome to read. But I believe, there is a great number of readers who are anxious to be acquainted with genuine Indian Philosophy and who will be thankful to me for this. Finally, I have desisted from giving in the eyes of the reader greater importance to the subject by accentuated spiritual illustrations. I have placed the things in the calm, clear light of the day. lie who really understands to see the important and to assess it, will also know to value it.

Lastly I may still emphasize that my treatise is fully elaborated out of the sources themselves. The only exception is in regard to the presentation of the teachings of Jina which are based on W. Schubring’s ‘Lehre der Jainas’. For the most part, I have gone my own way and have much differed from the presentations published hitherto. I have advanced, in short, proofs for my interpretations every time in the notes of the chapters concerned. The Translation of the texts chosen is not a philological interpretation and is meant to be readable and understandable and is aimed at being a right impression of essentials. Such passages are, therefore, smoothed over. From many versions I have chosen versions which appeared to sue better. I have skipped over unhesitatingly the controversial and the unimportant ones. As for the remaining, I wish to he able to satisfy further with writing in this respect on another occasion.

I have translated philosophical terms on principle. It might have been an advantage to retain the Indian expressions for untranslatable ideas. But what is right for one system is also fair to another. But in a whole presentation of Indian philosophy, there are a multitude of’ words which stem out of a language which is completely foreign to most people and which would, therefore, disturb and bewilder them. The translation also has its own difficulties and disadvantages. To meet them, I have, there fire, chosen the following way Above all, in the case of every technical term, I hold fast to its definite translation as far as possible, even where the meaning itself has undergone some change. How the term is to he understood, becomes evident out of the particular passage with sufficient clarity, whereas the retention of the same translation gives a fixed starting point for the fact as to which term is meant. Besides, I have included the Indian terms in brackets, perhaps in an overabundant measure. Ultimately, they are still the best basis in order to ascertain distinctly the different ideas. And he who has toiled through the treatise and the translations and has vainly endeavoured to ascertain as to which ideas lie concealed under the fluctuating and unclear translations, will give me the credit. It is obvious that he who has gained a great interest in the subject, will assimilate at least the basic ideas of the Sanskrit-language; to him, the citation of’ the Indian terms will be doubly welcome. The man, however, to whom the Sanskrit language is completely foreign, can read the matter away, undisturbed.

I give the Indian words in the nominative case. After all, finally, it. is a matter of personal liking. According to me, the stem-form appears to be appropriate and in its place in a linguistic work. In any other place, it makes on me the impression of a mutilation. In the transcription of the words, I hold to a scientifically customary way of transcription. It may have still many defects, but it has still the advantage to be acknowledged as uniform. And that is the most important consideration. How it is to be read is said in a few lines and this trouble is small in comparison with the unclearness which the arbitrariness in transcription brings with it, which many times puts the experts themselves into confusion. Thus is said what was the most important to be said about the aim and the accomplishment of this work.

The draft of the present volume was already written down in the winter of l97. The final conclusion and printing had to he greatly postponed on account of unfavourable times. in the case of a new revision, I felt it especially strongly how at every step, the problems allured further research. It could not otherwise be in a sphere where everything is in preparation. But in spite of that the attempt of a summarising treatise has its right and is even necessary. Science required that the draft of its results should not l)e indefinitely postponed. Above all, individual single research and synthesis should al— sways impregnate each other. As a painter sketches his picture its broadest features, in order to execute it in its single parts and to give the first outline its final form, so also scientific isolated individual research requires the broad frame, which it finally fills and which first he uses, in order to arrange and see the problems rightly. In this sense, it is here attempted to sketch in broad features a picture of Indian philosophy and its development, as far as the present condition of knowledge allows it. The ground-lines stand and remain as I wrote them years ago. Univ details arc supplemented and set right. This attempt, fuIl new in its own way, to present Indian Philosophy may stand the test and give a picture of the hitherto attained knowledge and suggest further research, until a later generation can seize it and can give the picture sketched here its final form. The next volume, I hope, would follow in the near Ibture; for the preliminaries have far advanced and the first difficulties have been overcome through the enterprising spirit of herr Otto Miller.

At the conclusion, I gladly fulfill the obligations to thank heartily all who have assisted me in the execution of this work. I began the composition of this work under the greatest difficulties, in the days of the Collapse, as a refugee without my usual working material and in the most modest circumstances. Already the procurement of the writing materials had been for a long time an almost insoluble problem. And the means of help which I could gradually procure were the most scarce, imaginable. That I could still begin the work was only possible through the fact that the ground -lines of earlier preliminary work had already been fixed. And I have experienced a disagreeable feeling that I had not the original texts at hand when I wrote out the presentation of the ancient times but had to take the help of the translations. Since then, I have had the possibility to go through the treatise once again and hope that no deficiencies have remained. But I should not omit to thank expressly those who have helped me in the most difficult period. ‘they are, above all, Herr Prof. Amman and Herr Dr. Oberhuber of the University of lnnsbruck who placed at my disposal in the friendliest manner the available material in their Institute. In Vienna, Herr Dr. Knobloch had the friendliness to look for me into different works which were inaccessible to me at that time. Finally, last though not the least, I thank the Farmer Stefan Haselberger in Fieberbrunn, with whom, I have found refuge with my family in the most difficult period; in his house I could begin the final working out of this work and could complete a great part of the first volume.

The present second volume of my History of Indian Philosophy is perhaps such as is of the least philosophical interest for a larger circle of readers. Between the bold beginnings of antiquity and the grand creations of the Buddhist system, the doctrines of natural philosophy operate like a valley between two eminences and that is understandable. Only a small modest material is available for the consideration of the natural philosophy of the ancient times. The development after some beautiful beginnings soon comes to a stop. New considerations for it do not come up, as systematic research is missing. S0 the doctrines become stiff or lifeless or degenerate into a hollow scholastics. What has been attained and presented is for the most part primitive and inadequate. In a certain measure, Greek philosophy has also not been spared from this fate. But the Indian philosophy in this sphere has not attained to a level approaching the performance of the Greeks.

In spite of these circumstances, I have considered it desirable, nay, necessary to deal also with this part of Indian philosophy with a certain tidiness. Firstly because it deals with one of the most ,important and original spheres of Indian philosophy. As against other philosophical creations, it was forgotten too easily that there were also other directions which did not create a philosophy out of longing for Deliverance but which endeavoured to explain the world in a scientific manner out of pure striving for philosophical knowledge. And this must be properly emphasised. Further these directions in philosophy played historically an important role. These directions have exercised influence from different sides. To him who does not know them, much in other systems would remain unintelligible—much that was created now in contrast, now in union, with other systems. Finally the Vaiesika, —the most important 0f the systems of Nature-philosophy—brought forth with its doctrine of the categories a creation which represents an important constituent of the thought-wealth of Indian philosophy. Wide layers of later Indian Philosophy are formed through the manner of thought of the Vaisesika and are dependent on it. They would be as little understood without the knowledge of this system as the scholastics of the Middle Ages without the philosophy of Aristotle.

By the way, as against Greek philosophy there appears a beautiful example of the peculiarity or originality of Indian philosophy. While the Greek philosophy rises up like a dazzling firework and produces in a short time an abundance of dazzling splendid creations, the Indian development rolls like a broad stream slowly through the centuries. But while the doctrine of categories in Aristotle remains a pretty idea, whose potentialities or possibilities are in no way worked out, in India it developed to a complete system, which far exceeds the beginnings of Aristotle’s and in further stretches gets choked up in arid ‘Scholastics’.

In certain particular respects, I would like to make a few following remarks regarding the present volume. As far as the Vaisesika is concerned, the treatises written on it up to now are based as a rule on the later handbooks. I have, on the other hand, based my presentation on the work of the classical period. I have tried, above all, to make intelligible the origin of the system. Whoever, in the history of Philosophy, is not satisfied with a collection of mere dry statements but seeks to understand the living thoughts and the men who thought them, must needs go to their origin. The great difficulty in the case of the Vaisesika is that the tradition preserved for us shows only the end of a long development. All the foregoing must be inferred. But I hope that I have succeeded to show rightly at least the broad lines. A reconstruction cannot naturally approach in its livingness an effective tradition. But an attempt must once be made. There remains a very serious lacuna in tradition which must he bridged over. In the matter of the presentation of the Buddhistic systems which will be dealt with in the next volume, the things are already incomparably favourable.

The description of the Naturo-philosophical system and of the development of the Vaisesika may perhaps appear somewhat detailed. The excuse for it lies in the great importance which this system had for Indian philosophy in general. Besides I request the reader to consider that the development, which I present here, extended over eight centuries. Besides, on this occasion, I would like to remark by way of principle that my treatise attempts to meet at the same time different needs. Nevertheless, in order not to tire the reader through excessive prolixity, I have endeavoured to present the matter in such a way that the particular sections remain understandable, even if the reader skips over certain isolated parts which are of less interest to him. For example, I have considered it desirable to give in the beginning of every chapter the sources and the condition of the handed- down tradition. He, who finds these concise, necessarily dry, sections uninteresting, can turn over these pages and immediately begin with the proper presentation. He who wants only the Dogmatics of the complete system will find it presented in a nutshell at the end of the particular chapter and he can estimate the history of development. The reader can, therefore, seize that which corresponds to his wishes but has also the possibility to look up also the other, if the need be.

The weakest part of this volume is the treatment of the system of the Jaina. It lies therein that only parts of the rich material, though preserved, are published. Besides, the published material was partially available to me. What I myself possess in this sphere is already on a modest scale and the publications in the libraries in Vienna are more inadequate in this sphere than in other spheres of Indology. My presentation is, therefore, proportionately scanty. Further I have restricted myself under these circumstances to describe the things as they appear to me. I must remain here solely responsible for its justification. I could have, no doubt, presented more but it is unsatisfactory to present a work when the means to accomplish it fail, as science recognizes them. I would like to remark that according to my view, there is much scope for further research in the sphere of Jainism, especially concerning the philosophical contents.

This is all, in the essentials, what was to be remarked in regard to this volume. As for the rest, what has been said concerning the whole work in the Foreword to the first volume, holds good also here. Concerning the reception which the first volume has received, it was gratifying. The evaluations are preponderatingly favourable adverse judgments have remained entirely sporadic. Especially individual reviews have occupied themselves with the work so exhaustively and the aim and the performance have been assessed with such complete understanding that I have heartily rejoiced at them. I hope this volume also will find the same approbation.

Finally I would like to thank all my scholarly colleagues who have helped me by sending the material, especially by sending the off prints which would, otherwise, have been difficult for me to obtain or would have been generally inaccessible. Above all I mention the name of my revered friend Mr. Et. Lamotte in Belgium, Messrs. H. v. Glasenapp, W. Ruben and F. Weller in Germany, Messrs P. Demiéville, J. Filliozat and A. Bateau in France, Prof. V. Raghavan and Prof. A. N. Upadhye in India, Prof. Upadhye has often most kindly helped me with his advice in the difficult constitution of the Jaina-works.