The Problem of Universals in Indian Philosophy

Foreword Philosophers, both in the East and the West, have been considerably exercised over the problem of Universals. Are they real entities, or are theymere fictions and fabrications of the human mind, or do they have some objective status, although not as factual entities? The Platonic and the Aristotelian standpoints are well-known, as are the solutions offered by the Nyaya-Vaisesika and Buddhism. Dr. Raja Ram Dravid gives in the following pages a full, clear, scholarly and eminently readable account of this problem as viewed by Indian Philosophers. In three rather long chapters, he also attempts a good exposition and analysis of the problem in Western thought. The main emphasis is, however, on the Universal in Indian thought, and Dr. Dravid is only secondarily concerned with Western philosophy.

Starting with the Nyaya-Vaiseshikas and Mimamsa Realisms, he goes to the Buddhist, Jaina, Vedanta (Advaita and Visistadvaita) and the Grammarian School of Bhartrhari. The various issues connected with this problem, the nature of the universals, their mode of existence and cognition and connection with words and things, are discussed at length with great analytical skill and insight. The merits and demerits of each point of view are brought out very clearly. I may draw particular attention to the excellent analysis of Buddhist Nominalism (Apohavada) and the views of the Grammar School as instances in this regard.

In writing this book Dr. Dravid has used the texts written by the masters of the different systems, instead of relying, as is generally done, on introductory texts. Again, he has not been content with the stating and examining of views system-wise. He has also treated separately the principal thinkers of each system taking care to show how the doctrines formulated by the different systems evolved, and how, and this is very important, the different masters of each system differed in many important respects. He has amply shown that the different schools are the different attempts to clarify the ontological and metaphysical insight at the root of the different systems.

Preface The concept of universal and the problems arising out of it form one of the most fundamental and most debated topics of Indian Philosophy. All systems of thought make important contributions on this subject. The whole discussion centres round the contention of the Nyaya-Vaisesika that the existence of universals is required not only epistemologically to explain our knowledge of things but also ontologically to explain the nature of the world. In the West also there have been periods when the problem of universals was the dominating theme of philosophical speculation. One such period was that of Plato and Aristotle, another was the Medieval. Even in the modern period philosophers, both of the rationalist and the empiricist schools, have paid serious attention to the problem. In my view, the problem is equally important and fundamental for our present day thinking also, for understanding of universals is necessary in order to understand knowledge.

I have endeavoured in this book to give a critical and comprehensive account of the discussion on universals in Indian Philosophy. I have examined and evaluated the various theories of universals advocated by different systems and suggested in the end a line of approach to the solution of the age-old problem. This in no way is the first attempt to give an account of the problem of universals in Indian Philosophy. Such renowned scholars as Stcherbatsky in Buddhist Logic and Dr. Satkari Mukherjee in The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux and The Jaina Philosophy of Non-absolutism have discussed the problem in some detail. In recent times Dr. D. N. Shastri in Critique of Indian Realism and Dr. G. N. Shastri in Philosophy of Word and Meaning have added a useful discussion on this subject. But the accounts of these authors are limited in scope naturally because the topic of universals forms only a small part of their work. Hence, a comprehensive and critical discussion of this fundamental problem covering all the important theories of universals in Indian philosophy and their mutual conflicts and criticisms, and a comparative study of them with their Western counterparts was very much needed. I have ventured to undertake this task.

Introduction The problem of universals is one of the most fundamental problems of philosophy. It is a very common, subtle and difficult topic of philosophical controversy It arises directly from our reflections upon experience, thought and language. We have, broadly speak-ing, two kinds of knowledge of things: sensuous and conceptual. Sensuous knowledge presents a thing in its concrete and particular aspect, whereas conceptual knowledge presents the same thing without any note of particularity. Although what we see and touch are particulars, when we think these particulars we cannot help using general concepts. Our judgement about a particular object affirms that it is of a certain kind, that it is of a certain genus and certain species. In other words, the objects outside the mind, as presented by sensuous knowledge, are particulars, whereas our concepts of them are general or universal. The same is true of our language also. It is a significant fact that almost all words in our language, except proper names, are general, whereas what exist in the outside world are particulars. It is by virtue of this generality that concepts and words become applicable to quite indefinite number of existing and possible objects.

Now the question naturally arises: are these concepts and words true? Do they give us any knowledge of the outside world? Does the universal concept in the mind, or the general word in our language, stand for something that is objectively real? In other words, are there universals just as there are particulars? How are the universals, if any, related to particulars? These and other allied questions have formed the topic of fundamental importance both in Indian and Western Philosophy. It is, indeed, of central importance to inquire as to what is the relation between mental concepts and objective reality. If universal concepts are said to have no foundation in extramental reality, i.e., if they are regarded as purely subjective constructions, then a rift between thought and reality is created.

Book's Contents and Sample Pages