The Six ways of Knowing (A Critical Study of the Advaita Theory of Knowledge)

It is a great regret that in spite of a persistent demand for the book in India and abroad, it had to remain out of print, since the destruction of stock by enemy action over London. Though, in view of the losses, the previous publishers, Messrs. George Allen and Unwin Ltd., were kind enough to write to me, as early as 24th June, 1946, relinquishing their rights to leave me "entirely free" to enable me "at once to approach another publisher", the difficulties created by the war also in India and my continuous pre-occupation with other works indefinitely delayed the necessary revision and re-edition. Meanwhile requests for the book came from some Indian Universities which had recommended the book, and from foreign scholars, some of whom had to go to the British Museum Library and the Library of Congress to read it as `a rare book, not lent out'. When the book was revised, Sir Jnan Chandra Ghosh, the former Vice-Chancellor of the University of Calcutta, was kind enough to go through some of the relevant correspondence, and the University undertook the publication of the revised edition in 1956.

But owing to heavy pressure of work the University Press could print it out only this year. In the work of revision I have tried to keep to the original plan and size of the book. I have been benefited very much by the extensive, scholarly criticisms and suggestions received from Professor Kalidas Bhattacharyya of Vishvabharati University. Professor Ganga Nath Bhattacharyya, an esteemed former colleague at Patna College, favoured me by going closely through the entire book, and suggesting many points for improvement. Professor Sudhindra Chandra Chakravarty of Vishvabharati and Atindra Mohan Gun of Calcutta Presidency College deserve my best thanks for reading some of the proofs. I must also thank Dr. Richard V. De Smet, S. J. (now a Professor at De Nobili College, Poona) who read the book at the British Museum, and used it for his Doctoral Dissertation for the Gregorian University, Rome, and reminded me repeatedly about the necessity of a second edition.

To my friend and former colleague at the University of Wisconsin, Professor William F. Goodwin, I am much obliged for lending me a copy of the first edition, bought by him second hand, but which had been previously owned and used by the late Professor George Santayana. Dreaming little that his copy will ever find its way back to the author in India, the great philospher made free and profuse comments on the margin, benefiting the author and also revealing himself as a keen, patient and critical student of Indian thought.

I am indebted to the staff of the Visvabharati Library for constant help. I must thank finally the University of Calcutta, and the Superintendent and staff of the University Press for all assistance in bringing out this hook, though late, yet in a suitable form.

WESTERN Philosophy generally recognizes two sources of knowledge-Perception and Inference. But Indian Philosophy presents a variety of opinions on this matter. The Carvakas admit only one source of valid knowledge-perception. The Bauddhas and some Vaisesikas admit two sources-perception and inference. To these the Sankhyas add a third-authority or testimony (S'abda). The Naiyayikas admit a fourth way of knowing-comparison (Upamana)-in addition to these three. The Prabhakaras again add to these four methods a fifth-postulation or assumption (arthapatti). The Bhattas and the monistic Vedantins recognize, however, six methods of knowledge, adding non-cognition (anupalabdhi) to the five already mentioned. We shall discuss here all the six methods of knowledge, as admitted by the Advaitins, one by one.

But before taking up the problems of our study proper, it is necessary to discuss in brief the Indian conceptions of knowledge (prama) and the methods of knowing (pramana), because they underlie all epistemological discussions. The Sanskrit word jnana stands for all kinds of cognition irrespective of the question of truth and falsehood. But the word prama is used to designate only a true cognition (yatharthajnana) as distinct from a false one (mithya-jnana). In English the word knowledge implies a cognition attended with belief. If, therefore, a cognition turns out to be false, belief in it is immediately withdrawn and as such it should cease to be called knowledge. Consequently knowledge, strictly speaking, should always stand only for a cognition that is true, uncontradicted or unfalsified. The ordinary division of knowledge into true knowledge and false knowledge should, therefore, be considered as an instance of loose thinking; the word true as applied to knowledge would then be a tautology, and the word false positively contradictory-false knowledge being only a name for falsified knowledge, which is another name for no knowledge. If this logical meaning of the word knowledge be consistently and rigidly adhered to, knowledge will exactly correspond to the word prama. Prama is generally defined as a cognition having the twofold characteristics of truth and novelty (abadhitatva or yatharthatva and anadhigatatva).' As regards the first characterstic, truth, all schools of the Indian philosophy are unanimous. Every philosopher holds that truth should be the differentia of knowledge or prams. But views as regards the meaning of truth vary, and consequently the mark of a pram a is variously expressed. Broadly speaking there are at least four different views about truth. According to one view the truth of knowledge consists in its practical value. A true congnition is, therefore, variously defined as that which reveals an object that serves some purpose (artha or prayojana) or leads to the achievement of some end,' or which favours a successful volition (samvadiprav ratya-nukula).

This view will at once be seen to resemble the modern pragmatic theory of the West. It is mostly held by the Buddhists, but other writers also occasionally support it. Another view, that we find chiefly in the Nyaya works, regards truth as the faithfulness with which knowledge reveals its objects. True knowledge is, therefore, defined as that which informs us of the existence of something in a place where it really exists, or which predicates of something a character really possessed by it.' This view resembles the correspondence theory of Western realists. A third view, which is incidentally referred to by many writers, regards truth as a harmony of experience (samvada or samvaditva). A true knowledge according to this view, would be one which is in harmony with other experiences.' This view again resembles the Western theory of coherence.

The Advaita school of Vedanta, however, favours a fourth view according to which the truth of knowledge consists in its non-contradictedness (abadhitatva). The correspondence view of truth cannot directly prove itself. The only way to prove correspondence is to fall back on the foreign method of consilience or coherence (samvada)-that is to infer the existence of a real correspondence between knowledge and reality from the facts of the harmony of experience. But all that we can legitimately. infer from the harmony of knowledge with the rest of our experience up tolltat time, is not that the knowledge is absolutely free from error; but that it is not yet contradicted. For we do not know that we shall not have in future any experience that can falsify our present knowledge. As regards the pragmatic test of causal efficiency (artha-kriya-karitava), the Advaitins argue that even a false cognition may, and sometimes does, lead to the fulfilment of a purpose. One of the examples' they cite to support their view is the case of a distant bright jewel which emits lustre. We mistake the lustre for the jewel and, desiring to get the mistaken object of our knowledge, approach it and actually get the jewel.

In this case, therefore, the knowledge of lustre as the jewel-which is clearly a false cognition -leads to the attainment of the jewel and thereby satisfies our purpose, though eventually we come also to know that the initial cognition which caused our action was itself false. We can multiply instances of this kind. The hypothesis that the earth is stationary and the sun is moving has been working quite satisfactorily for ages; on the basis of this cognition many of our actions are performed and purposes attained. It is only its conflict with astronomical phenomena that enables us to detect its falsity. It is found, therefore, that the pragmatic view of truth is not tenable. The correspondence view has ultimately to fall back on the consilience or coherence theory which, when subjected to strict scrutiny, has to yield the result that truth, as ascertained by it, consists only in its non-contradictedness. According to the Advaitins, therefore, prams or knowledge must have as one of its characteristics truth; and the truth of prama consists in its content being uncontradiced (abadhiartha-visayakatva).' The second characteristic of prama or knowledge is, as we have already said, novelty.

It is not sufficient that knowledge should be true, it is also necessary that the content of knowledge should be new or previously unacquired-anadhigata. On this point, however, not all authorities arc unanimous; while some (e.g. Mimamsakas) consider it to be an essential part of the differentia of knowledge, others think it unnecessary as unduly narrowing the scope of knowledge. The Vedantists seem to be rather indifferent to this controversy and unwilling to take sides' The material part of the controversy turns upon the question whether memory should be admitted to have the status of knowledge. If truth he the sole characteristic of knowledge, memory, in so far as it is uncontradicted or undoubted, has to be called knowledge. But there is a peculiarity about memory that deserves special consideration. The only claim of memory to belief lies in its explicit reference to a past experience which it professes to reproduce faithfully. A remembered fact is belived to be true just because it is regarded as identical with the content of a past experience which it claims to represent. This confessed and explicit falling back on the past experience means its self-abdication in favour of its archetype. Thus the question of treating memory as a distinct type of knowledge does not at all arise, being barred ex hypothesi. The only kind of knowledge is then the knowledge of the already unacquired. But though memory is not a distinct source of knowledge, it is still a distinct experience that has to be distinguished from knowledge and given a separte name. The experience which reveals the new (i.e. knowledge proper) is called anubjuti, whereas reproduced knowledge is called smrti Thus novelty comes to be considered an essential quality of knowledge.