A Nuclear Strategy for India
Book Specification
Item Code: | IDE623 |
Author: | Rear Admiral & Raja Menon |
Publisher: | Sage Publications India Pvt. Ltd. |
Language: | English |
Edition: | 2000 |
ISBN: | 0761994610 |
Pages: | 316 |
Cover: | Paperback |
Other Details | 8.5" X 5.5" |
Book Description
This topical, and important book comes at a time when India's position on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) has aroused controversy in international undergoing significant changes, and when the world is taking rapid technological strides.
Perhaps the first effort to articulate a coherent nuclear strategy for India, the book begins by providing a framework that rests on a theory of international relations in which the use of force is postulated. Admiral Menon then discusses the experience of Western countries in acquiring tactical nuclear weapons and Indian criticisms of Western nuclear doctrines. This is followed by a discussion of India's journey to acquiring nuclear weapons which presents, for the first time, a coordinated analysis of the roles played by the military, the scientific establishment and diplomats combined with the technological and economic dimensions.
The next two chapters are devoted to strategy. The author introduces quantitative analysis into the nuclear debate as also discusses the little understood phenomenon of the technological pressures which influence the decision to introduce newer weapons. Admiral Menon describes India's arsenal and the rationale behind it and outlines deterrence theory. The book ends by locating India's nuclear strategy in the international environment in the light of the 1998 nuclear test.
This valuable and timely book, will numerous first to its credit, will interest all those interested in the nuclear debate, strategic and military studies, international relations, science and technology studies, and contemporary Indian politics and diplomacy.
About the Author:
Rear Admiral Raja Menon retired in 1994 as the Assistant Chief of Naval Staff (Operations) in which job he was responsible for formulating strategy. He is a visiting lecturer at India's foreign Service Training Institute, at the Defence Service Staff College, the Naval Higher Command Course and the National Defence College.
List of Tables | 10 | |
List of Figures | 11 | |
List of Abbreviations | 13 | |
Preface | 19 | |
Acknowledgements | 22 | |
1. | International Relations and India's Geopolitical Environment | 23 |
The Idealism in Indian Foreign Policy | 23 | |
Freud vs Marx | 26 | |
The Status Quo Power and the Revisionist Power | 27 | |
Politics and Military Power | 29 | |
Coercive Nuclear Diplomacy | 32 | |
The Clausewitzian Divide | 35 | |
2. | The Western Narrative: Western Nuclear Theology | 41 |
Nuclear Diplomacy | 41 | |
Early Strategy | 44 | |
Deterrence | 46 | |
NSC-68 | 46 | |
Arsenals | 47 | |
Massive Retaliation and the New Look | 48 | |
Strategic Vulnerability | 49 | |
The McNamara Years | 49 | |
The SIOP, Counter-force and Assured Destruction | 52 | |
Targeting Policy | 54 | |
McNamara's Legacy | 54 | |
Tactical Nuclear Weapons | 55 | |
Sufficiency and Finite Targeting | 56 | |
Flexible Targeting and Counter-force II | 57 | |
PD-59 and Countervailing Strategy | 57 | |
National Security Decision Directive No. 12 (NSSD-12) | 59 | |
The Soviet Strategy | 60 | |
The INF Controversy | 60 | |
The Irresistable Pull of Technology | 62 | |
The Lessons for Nuclear Strategy | 63 | |
3. | The Indian Narrative | 66 |
Homi Bhabha | 66 | |
The Tata Institute of Fundamental Research and Indian Rare Earths Limited | 67 | |
India, the USSr and China: The Early Years | 68 | |
The Beginnings of Rivalry | 70 | |
The End of Idealism | 73 | |
Take a Horse to Water | 75 | |
Alterations of Course with Sarabhai | 77 | |
A Fork in the Road | 83 | |
Pokhran I | 85 | |
The Late Fee for strategic Delays | 87 | |
The Subcontinental Straw | 89 | |
A Second Chance | 92 | |
Diplomacy First, Strategy Second | 94 | |
The Chinese Accelerate | 95 | |
Brasstacks | 98 | |
Thrashing About in the Bushes | 100 | |
The Dangers of Nuclear Ambiguity | 102 | |
Doing Nothing is Doing Something | 104 | |
The Military Shoot Themselves in the Foot - Again | 107 | |
The CTBT Imbroglio | 108 | |
Losing the way | 111 | |
Leading to Pokhran II | 113 | |
4. | Pure Strategy and Technology | 122 |
The Attractions of Technology | 122 | |
Nuclear Warheads | 124 | |
The Effects of Nuclear Weapons | 124 | |
The Technology of Missile Accuracy | 128 | |
Nuclear Weapons Development | 136 | |
Yield, Blast and Multiple Warheads | 138 | |
The Tripwire Strategy and First Use | 140 | |
The Future of Nuclear Weapons | 142 | |
Pure Strategy | 145 | |
Deterrence by Punishment | 146 | |
Deterrence By Denial | 146 | |
Arsenals Related to Deterrence | 148 | |
Rationality | 151 | |
Perception | 152 | |
Defensive Avoidance | 154 | |
Graduating to Nuclear Strategy | 155 | |
The Weakness of Massive Retaliation | 156 | |
Flexible Targeting | 158 | |
Brinkmanship | 161 | |
Counter-force, First Strike and Stabiligy | 163 | |
First Strike and Second Strike | 164 | |
The Unbreakable Merit of a Second Strike | 167 | |
The Dangers of Secretiveness | 167 | |
Counter force and Flexible Response | 168 | |
Conventional War and Flexible Response | 169 | |
Non-weaponised Deterrence or Recessed Deterrence | 171 | |
5. | The Indian Arsenal | 177 |
The Sino-Indian Political Scenario | 177 | |
The Old Chinese Arsenal | 180 | |
The New Chinese Arsenal | 183 | |
The Chinese Arsenal and India | 186 | |
The India-China Net Level of Expectation | 190 | |
The Indo-Pak Nuclear Calculus | 192 | |
The Merits and Demerits of Pakistan's Nuclear Logic | 194 | |
The Pakistan Arsenal | 198 | |
Reducing the Height of the Hill - Nuclear CBMs in South Asia | 201 | |
Indian Technological Levels | 206 | |
Fissile Material | 207 | |
Missile Accuracy | 209 | |
Warhead Design | 215 | |
Strategic Surveillance and the Degrading of Deterrence | 218 | |
The Mobile Launcher versus Silo Argument | 220 | |
The Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile Force for India | 224 | |
The Indian Nuclear Submarine | 226 | |
The Indian Missile Force | 228 | |
The India-Pakistan Scenario, Flexible Response and the Cruise Missile | 230 | |
6. | The Command and Control System | 235 |
The Creation of Deterrence | 241 | |
Transiting from Conventional War to Deterrence | 242 | |
Managing the Conventional War, Centrally | 245 | |
Planning the Use of Nuclear Weapons | 247 | |
The Chiefs of Staff Committee's 'Country' Targeting List | 248 | |
Nuclear Staff Requirements (NSRs) | 249 | |
The Alerting System and Deterrence | 252 | |
Decapitation | 254 | |
Unwarranted or Accidental Nuclear Occurrence | 256 | |
The Serviceabiligy and Safety of Nuclear Weapons | 259 | |
Separating Ownership from Control | 261 | |
The Indian Early Warning System | 261 | |
Early Warning Over the Sea | 264 | |
Satellite Surveillance and Early Warning | 266 | |
The National Command Authority | 269 | |
Delegation of Authority | 271 | |
The National Command Post | 271 | |
Communications | 272 | |
The ICBM Launch Control Net | 278 | |
The SLBM Launch Control Net | 279 | |
The Hot Line | 281 | |
7. | The Indian Nuclear Strategy and the International Environment | 284 |
American Political Views | 284 | |
The Sanctions | 288 | |
The CTBT and the Future | 290 | |
The United States, Bus Diplomacy and Nuclear Restraint | 292 | |
Lowering the Heights of the Hill | 296 | |
The Future of Nuclear Weapons Use - The Superpowers | 297 | |
The European Arsenals | 300 | |
The Influence of International Agencies | 301 | |
The Future | 303 | |
Postscript | 306 | |
Index | 309 | |
About the Author | 316 |